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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
ALFRED N. ASPER, ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
ANE A, ASPER, ) Case No. 870076-CA 
) District Court No. D85-2070 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review the Decree of Divorce and 
Judgment entered by the Third Judicial District Court in this 
matter on January 26, 1987, is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 3 & 4 and Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3 (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court have the authority to extend 
support payments and insurance programs for the benefit of the 
minor child until her twenty-fifth birthday? 
II. Did the trial court err in the amount of child 
support ordered to be paid? 
III. Did the trial court err in calculating plaintiff's 
equity in the marital home at $35,214.50? 
IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
awarding $6,000 in attorney fees in favor of the wife? 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
The following statutes are relevant to this case: 
15-2-1. Period of Minority. 
The period of minority extends in males 
and females to the age of eighteen years; but 
all minors obtain their majority by marriage. 
It is further provided that courts in divorce 
actions may order support to age 21. Utah 
Code Ann. S 15-2-1 (1986). 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Mainte-
nance and health care of parties and children 
- Court to have continuing jurisdiction -
Custody and visitation - Termination of ali-
mony - Nonmeritorious petition for 
modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is ren-
dered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility 
for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent 
children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a rea-
sonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospi-
tal, and dental care insurance for the depen-
dent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order 
determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion 
of child care expenses incurred on behalf of 
the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial par-
ent. If the court determines that the cir-
cumstances are appropriate and that the 
dependent children would be adequately cared 
for, it may include an order allowing the 
non-custodial parent to provide the day care 
for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdic-
tion to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for the support and maintenance of the par-
ties, the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as 
is reasonable and necessary. Utah Code Ann. 
S 30-3-5 (1984 & Supp. 1987). 
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78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(4) Child means a son or daughter under 
the age of 18 years and a son or daughter of 
whatever age who is incapacitated from earn-
ing a living and without sufficient means. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-2 (1987). 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every man shall support his child; and he 
shall support his wife when she is in need. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-3 (1987). 
78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she 
shall support her husband when he is in need. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-4 (1987). 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support 
- Assessment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to 
the amount granted by prior court order 
unless there has been a material change of 
circumstance on the part of the obligor or 
obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order existsf or a 
material change in circumstances has occur-
red, the court, in determining the amount of 
prospective support, shall consider all rele-
vant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-45-7 (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Husband appeals from provisions of the Decree and 
Judgment governing child support, division of property and the 
award of attorney's fees entered in this matter on January 26, 
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1987, by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding. 
On January 26, 1987, the marriage of the parties was 
terminated by a Decree of Divorce. (R.78). Under the provisions 
of the Decree, appellant was ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance for the arthritic child to age 25 and to pay 
$650.00 per month as child support for her until she reaches age 
twenty-five. (R. 79). He was further ordered to pay one-half of 
the child's medical expenses not covered by insurance. (R. 80). 
The parties divided the personal property and it was awarded as 
stipulated. (R. 80-82). The court awarded each one-half of 
husband's retirement. (R. 82). The marital home was awarded to 
respondent, subject to the mortgage and a lien in favor of 
husband for one-half of the equity payable without interest, 
after allowance for payment of estimated real estate commissions 
and closing costs, or $35,214.50. (R. 82). He was ordered to 
pay a $750.00 orthodontist's bill and $6,000.00 for the benefit 
of respondent, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred by 
her in litigating this matter. (R. 80, 83). 
The parties were married on June 9, 1959, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 66). They are the parents of three children, two 
of whom have reached majority and one of whom is age 17, born 
September 19, 1969, currently resides with respondent. (Id.) 
This child is afflicted with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis. 
(Id.). The trial court received into evidence a letter by Dr. 
John R. Ward, professor of medicine at the University of Utah, 
which provided: 
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Connie should be considered permanently dis-
abled pending such time that she is able to 
gain specific job skills through an educa-
tional process which will prepare her for 
competition in the job market. 
(R. 67; Docketing Statement, Exh. D). Wife claimed $60.00 per 
month in medical expenses for herself and the children. (R. 23). 
Appellant earns a gross monthly income of $3,326.27 
(R. 66), and nets between $2,100.00 and $2,400.00 per month. 
(Transcript at 19, LL. 10-12 Transcript at 20, 11. 1-4). Respon-
dent is employed, as she was throughout the marriage earning 
approximately $1,100.00 net income per month on a part-time 
basis. (R. 66; Transcript at 25, LL. 12-25). She estimated her 
living expenses at between $1,765.00 and $2,095.00 per month 
(Transcript at 22, L. 12; Transcript at 28, LL. 17-18). 
During the pendency of this matter, the parties agreed 
that the husband would pay $250.00 a month temporary child sup-
port (Transcript at 24, LL. 10-13). In her Complaint, wife 
sought $150.00 per month child support. (R. 3). At trial, wife 
asked for $350.00 per month child support although, "we may be 
entitled to $360.00 a month child support if you go by the sched-
ule." (Transcript at 9, LL. 2-4). 
Husband and wife agreed that the fair market value of 
the home at trial was $104,400.00 with an outstanding mortgage of 
$25,027.15. (R. 23). They both evidenced a desire that the 
equity in the home be evenly divided. (Transcript at 8, 16). 
They disagreed over the wife's inclusion of an estimated real 
estate commission fee of more than $6,000.00 and closing costs. 
(R. 25, Transcript at 8-10). 
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Husband appeals from the trial court's order relating 
to the duration and amount of child supportr division of the mar-
ital home equity, and award of attorney's fees. He seeks to have 
the judgment of the trial court amended by this court* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court may impose an obligation of continued 
support beyond the age of 18 where the child is incapable of 
self-support and the trial court makes a special finding to jus-
tify such continued support. When that finding is made, the 
amount ordered to be paid must not be excessive and must be sup-
ported by the evidence presented. Here, the trial court abused 
its discretion by awarding continued child support after majority 
where the court received no evidence to support its conclusion 
and made no findings of any special circumstances justifying con-
tinued child support. 
The trial court in this matter erred in awarding as 
child support an amount approximately double that sought by 
respondent and considerably more than amounts ordered to be paid 
under analogous cases. 
The lower court erred in failing to effect the rule of 
law articulated by the Utah Supreme Court that where a court 
makes an equal division of marital home equity, the spouse not in 
possession should receive one-half of the actual sale price. 
The award to wife of the total amount of attorney's 
fees requested by her is excessive in light of both the facts of 
this case and other Utah decisions which have awarded wife 
approximately one-third the amount of attorney's fees sought, 
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based upon a showing that wife's expenses exceed her monthly 
earnings, 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECREE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE 
CHILD SUPPORT AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
ONLY TO AGE 21. 
The trial court may impose a reasonable level of 
support and insurance programs for the benefit of the minor child 
beyond age 18 only where the trial court has made special find-
ings based upon the evidence that the child is incapable of 
self-support. Here the trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding child support to age 25 where the court received no 
evidence to support this ruling and made no findings of special 
circumstances justifying continued support. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
support after majority where the child or children in question 
suffered from epileptic seizures, Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 
(Utah 1980) , and retardation. Garrand v. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012 
(Utah 1978), modified, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980); Dehm v. Dehmy 
545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). The conclusion reached by the court in 
these cases is that a reasonable level of support and insurance 
programs for the benefit of the child may be continued beyond age 
21 where the court determines that: (1) the child is unable to 
be self-supporting; (2) that determination is supported by the 
evidence; and (3) that determination is reflected in the court's 
special findings. Garrand, 615 P.2d at 423; Harris v. Harris, 
585 P.2d 435 (Utah 1978); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864f 865 
(Utah 1978). 
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For example, in Dehm, wife sought modification of the 
decree to provide for continued child support and insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the parties' 20-year-old retarded 
twin girls. 545 P.2d at 526. The court held that the lower 
court properly ordered continued support for the children beyond 
majority where the evidence presented at trial indicated the need 
for a lifetime of specialized care without the possibility of the 
children being able to provide for their own meals, personal 
hygiene, or self-support. 545 P.2d at 546. In English v. 
English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), husband argued that the trial 
court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering him to main-
tain a life insurance program for the benefit of the children 
until each child attained the age of 25. 565 P.2d at 412. The 
court stated that, "[slince the record does not reveal that any 
of the children has an incapacity or disability, defendant's duty 
to support them terminates at the age of 21." Id. 
The necessity for evidence concerning the needs of the 
child with special problems was reiterated by the court in 
Jackman v. Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah 1985). In Jackman, 
wife asserted that the trial court erred in precluding testimony 
concerning the need for child support for the couple's 18-year-
old son. The court agreed and remanded for further proceedings. 
The court stated, 
The trial court had no discretion to exclude 
evidence relevant to the appropriateness for 
the child support for the son. It should 
have heard the evidence and made findings of 
fact regarding the son's alleged incapacities 
and need for support. 
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696 P.2d at 1193 (citing Carlson, 584 P.2d at 865; Harris, 585 at 
437). 
In Harris, wife sought to modify the decree to increase 
child support payments for the eldest child, who was healthy, 
continuing past the age of 18 because the child was a full-time 
college student. The court concluded that the trial court had 
discretion in deciding whether or not to order child support to 
continue after age 18f relying upon Dehm. However, the supreme 
court reversed and remanded on the grounds that no findings were 
made of any special or unusual circumstances justifying continued 
support. 585 P.2d at 437. Because the record failed to ade-
quately justify extended child support, the obligation automati-
cally terminated at age 21. 585 P.2d at 436; English, 565 at 
412. 
In Carlson, former wife brought an action to modify the 
divorce decree to increase monthly child support allowance and 
extend such payments until the children reached age 21. The 
court reversed the trial court's order modifying the divorce 
decree on the grounds that absent any findings of any special or 
unusual circumstances, the order could not properly stand. 584 
P.2d at 866. The court stated, 
The significant and controlling proposition 
here is that a search of the findings of the 
trial court fails to disclose any finding of 
any special or unusual circumstances which 
would justify the order compelling the defen-
dant to support the children beyond the age 
of 18, when they attain the age of maturity 
and are thus emancipated. In the absence of 
such a finding, the order cannot properly 
stand. 
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Id. 
These rulings by the Utah Supreme Court demonstrate 
that the trial court erred in continuing support and insurance 
programs for the benefit of the parties' minor child until age 25 
in this case. Nowhere in the transcript of the hearings before 
the trial court is there a request by the wife that child support 
be extended beyond age 21 or to the age 25, that the child's 
physician considered the minor child incapable of self-support 
until age 25, that the minor child would remain a student to age 
25, that she was willing to be a student, that she was unable to 
attend to her personal needs, or any other evidence indicating 
circumstances warranted the award of child support to the age of 
25. 
The trial court received into evidence a letter by Dr. 
John R. Ward, professor of medicine at the University of Utah, 
which provided: 
Connie should be considered permanently dis-
abled pending such time that she is able to 
gain specific job skills through an educa-
tional process which will prepare her for 
competition in the job market. 
(Docketing Statement, Exh. D.; R. 66). The ambiguity of Dr. 
Ward's opinion is emphasized by the construction placed upon it 
by respondent's counsel during the November 20, 1986 hearing. At 
the hearing, he stated that Dr. Ward's letter demonstrated that 
the child, "is incapable of gainful employment and will be in 
that same condition when she turns 18." (Transcript at 8, L. 
20-22) . He further stated that it was his understanding that, 
"the Court had ruled on child support and until the age of 21, 
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that being the Court's ruling but there's a dispute about that." 
(Transcript at 8f LL. 12-14). 
The dispute between the parties concerned the amount of 
child support and the court's inclination to extend child support 
to age 21. (Transcript at 8, LL. 12-14, 24-25). Without addi-
tional evidence, the court concluded that the child would remain 
in the home after age 21, (Transcript at 13, L. 3-4), and 
required support to age 25. (Transcript at 15, LL. 24, 25). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, 
[T]hough children attain their majority and 
thus become emancipated at age 18, there may 
nevertheless be unusual circumstances where 
the court would be justified in placing that 
additional burden on the parents. However, 
it is to be kept in mind that any discretion-
ary power is not absolute, but must be exer-
cised with reason and good conscience upon a 
foundation of facts so justifying. 
Carlson, 584 at 865. It is for this reason that the court has 
ruled that where a child is incapacitated from earning a living 
and is without sufficient means, the divorce court may order sup-
port so long as the child is disabled. But to do so, the trial 
court must base its decision upon adequate foundation and must 
reflect the basis of its determination in special findings. 
Here, the court received no evidence and made no findings of a 
disability that would justify continued support until age 25. 
The order was based solely upon the court's belief that in this 
case the child should receive support until age 25. Such a deci-
sion is arbitrary, unwarranted, contrary to law and must be 
amended by this court to provide that support shall terminate at 
age 21. 
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II. THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED TO 
BE PAID IS EXCESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
A reasonable level of child support and insurance 
programs for the benefit of the minor child may be awarded beyond 
age 18 where the child is incapacitated. The trial court in this 
matter awarded an excessive amount, approximately double that 
sought by respondent and considerably more than amounts ordered 
to be paid in prior analogous cases. No evidence was produced at 
trial justifying the amount ordered to be paid. Appellant had no 
notice that the court was so inclined to make an award of $650.00 
per month child support to age 25 and is without sufficient means 
to make the payments he was ordered to make. The amount of child 
support ordered was excessiver unfair and inequitable. 
The decision of the trial court will be disturbed only 
where the evidence so preponderates against the trial court's 
findings that it appears to be unjust, inequitable, or contrary 
to the evidence and therefore an abuse of discretion. McBroom v. 
McBroomf 384 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1963) (husband and wife appeal 
support and property division); Owen v. Owenr 579 P.2d 911, 913 
(Utah 1978) (petition to modify decree to increase child sup-
port). Support awarded must not be excessive, must be supported 
by the evidence, and the basis of the award must be reflected in 
the court's findings. Garrand v. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012 (Utah 
1978), modified, 615 P.2d 422, 423 (Utah 1980); Harris v. Harris, 
585 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1978); Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 
865-67 (Utah 1978). 
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The trial court in this matter awarded wife $650.00 per 
month child support until the minor child reaches age 25 (R. at 
60, 79). This amount is considerably more than amounts awarded 
in prior analogous cases. In Keisel v. Keisel, 619 P.2d 1374 
(Utah 1980) a father appealed from an order increasing child 
support payments for the benefit of his epileptic daughter. 
Under the terms of the original divorce decree, husband was 
ordered to pay $75.00 per month for the child. Later, the child 
was severely burned during a seizure. The trial court modified 
the decree to increase child support to $150.00 per month. In 
ordering the increase, the court took into account the husband's 
increased salary and new business. In Garrand, the supreme court 
affirmed the award of $150.00 per month to provide for the 
couple's 21-year-old retarded child. Although Keisel does not 
indicate the amount that the father earned at the time of the 
award for child support, the husband in Garrand earned $27,000.00 
at the time of the divorce. Garrand, 581 P.2d at 1013. After 
finding the twin retarded daughters of the parties to be incompe-
tent and dependent, the court in Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P,2d 525 (Utah 
1976), ordered the husband to pay $325.00 per month to be contin-
ued indefinitely. The husband earned $1,300.00 per month at the 
time the divorce decree was entered, and the wife earned $220.00 
per month. At the time of hearing on the petition for modifica-
tion, husband's income had increased to $2,200.00 and wife's to 
$946.00 per month. 
The award granted by the court in this matter is 
excessive, unjust and inequitable. At the time of trial, 
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husband's net income was represented as between $2,100.00 and 
$2,400.00 per month (Transcript at 19, 25), less than the amount 
earned by the husband in Garrand. The wife's current income 
working part-time was represented to be $1,100.00 per month 
(R. 66; Transcript at 25). During the pendency of this matter, 
the parties agreed that the husband would pay $250.00 a month 
temporary child support (Transcript at 24, LL. 10-13). In her 
Complaint, wife sought $150.00 per month child support. (R. 3). 
At trial wife asked for $350.00 per month child support although, 
"we may be entitled to $360.00 a month child support if you go by 
the schedule." (Transcript at 9, LL. 2-4). 
The court indicated at the September 16, 1986 hearing 
following meeting with counsel in chambers that, 
I think we have arrived at a settlement which 
I will order whether you decide to or not, 
because I think it is fair to both of you. 
And I have taken care of your child and you, 
and we've got a system we are working out for 
you if that's what you want to do. 
(Transcript at 4, LL. 1-6). Still further, the court stated, 
"[c]hild support I have pretty well determined. I'm looking at 
$350, and its going to go to 21. . . . " (Transcript at 15, LL. 
23-25). 
From the transcript of the proceedings and the lack of 
evidence presented regarding Connie's future plans and require-
ments, it is obvious that husband had no warning that the court 
was considering a sum double the amount either party anticipated 
or extending it to age 25. Both hearings were devoted to the 
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possibility of child support to age 21f alimony, the division of 
property, and award of attorney's fees. 
The parties had reached a tentative settlement with the 
exception of a few details to be decided upon by the court after 
proffers and evidence were submitted. Prior to testimonial evi-
dence being offered in the November 20, 1986 hearing, the trial 
judge indicated that he had already determined the disposition of 
the parties' assets and child support (Transcript at 4, 16). As 
the hearing developed, the court expressed his disapproval of 
Utah alimony laws (Transcript at 13-15) and his concern that wife 
be able to meet her living expenses. (Transcript at 12). The 
focus of the court was not upon the monetary needs of the child 
between ages 18 and 25. 
The amount and duration of child support is not sus-
tained by the evidence presented. The evidence does not show the 
child's anticipated needs nor her present extraordinary needs 
(See R. at 23). Wife claimed only $60.00 in medical expenses for 
herself and two children (R. 23). Any future medical expenses 
would be partially carried by the husband, who was ordered to 
provide health insurance and to pay one-half of the medical 
expenses not covered. (R. 79). There was no showing that the 
minor child's educational needs were in any way different from 
those of healthy, college-bound or trade-school oriented, 
children who lack the skills at age 18 to automatically enter the 
job market. Nor was there a special finding of circumstances as 
required by law to justify compelling the husband to assist his 
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adult child in furthering her education. Carlson, 584 P.2d at 
865-66. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
We remain cognizant of the perogatives of the 
trial court and the latitude of discretion it 
is properly allowed in divorce cases. But 
this discretion is not without limit, nor 
immune from correction on review, if that is 
warranted. Due to the seriousness of such 
proceedings and the vital effect they have 
upon people's lives, it is also the responsi-
bility of this court to carefully survey what 
is done, and while the determinations of the 
trial court are given deference and not dis-
turbed lightly, changes should be made if 
that seems essential to the accomplishment of 
the desired objectives of the decree: that 
is, to make such an arrangement of the prop-
erty and economic resources of the parties 
that they will have the best possible oppor-
tunity to reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis for themselves and their 
children. 
DeRose v. DeRosef 19 Utah 2d 77, 79, 426 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 
1967) (appeal from property division and alimony award). The 
child support awarded by the lower court is excessive, unfair and 
unduly burdensome on the husband. The evidence does not support 
the court's order and there is no special finding justifying the 
amount and duration of child support awarded. Because the trial 
court abused its discretion, the decree should be amended to pro-
vide child support in the sum of $350.00 per month, the amount 
requested by the respondent in the court below. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING PLAIN-
TIFF'S EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME. 
The rule of law articulated by the Utah Supreme Court 
is that where a trial court makes an equal division of marital 
home equity, the spouse not in possession should receive one-half 
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of the actual sale price of the home. Here, the trial court 
erred in charging husband with one-half of estimated commission 
and closing costs. 
An appeal from the property division in a divorce 
action may be reviewed both as to law and facts. Berqer v. 
Berqer, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). The judgment of the court 
will be overturned where the trial court misunderstands or 
misapplies the law or has abused its discretion so that the rul-
ing is inequitable or unjust. Id.; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). These principles require this court 
to amend the Decree in regard to the award to appellant of his 
equity in his home. 
According to the transcript taken of proceedings in 
this matter, the trial court received into evidence certain home 
documents offered by the wife's attorney evidencing, "a real 
estate commission deduction, closing costs, mortgage and the 
share of each of the parties," (Transcript at 22, LL. 1-5); the 
husband's updated Financial Declaration (Transcript at 18, 31); 
and other documents previously filed (Transcript at 16; R. 25). 
Husband and wife agreed that the fair market value of the home at 
trial was $104,400.00 with an outstanding mortgage of $25,027.15. 
(R. 23). They both evidenced a desire that the equity in the 
home should be evenly divided. (Transcript at 8, 16). They dis-
agreed over the wife's inclusion of an estimated real estate com-
mission fee of more than $6,000.00 and closing costs. (R. 25, 
Transcript at 8-10). 
The trial court memorandum made the following award: 
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The home of the parties should be awarded to 
Defendant, subject to the mortgage thereon, 
which she should assume and pay, and Plain-
tiff should have the lien on the home in the 
amount of $35,214.50 payable without interest 
upon whichever of the following events first 
occurs: sale of the home, Defendant's remar-
riage, or when Connie becomes twenty-five 
years of age. 
(R. at 61, H 9). The trial court erred in awarding husband a 
share of the home equity less estimated closing and commission 
costs. 
Utah statutes and decisional law do not address the 
precise question presented here. However, in two recent deci-
sions the court has expressed appropriate guidelines. In Workman 
v. Workman, 652 P.2d 231 (Utah 1982), husband in a 13-year child-
less marriage challenged the division of the marital home equity. 
Neither party was employed. The trial court ordered the husband 
to purchase the wife's interest within six months at the 
appraised price or put the property on the market immediately and 
pay to her after sale the sum of $59,680.00 with interest. The 
court adopted the professional appraiser's estimate that the 
property was worth $119,360.00. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court's valuation of the property and its award of 
approximately 60% of the marital property to wife and 40% to the 
husband. However, the court held that the trial court erred in 
requiring husband to pay to wife half of the appraised value if 
he elected to sell the home, regardless of its sale price. The 
court stated: 
An appraisal may be the most accurate esti-
mate of the price a property will bring on 
the open market, but it is only an estimate. 
Where the court makes an equal division of 
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the value of a property, we see no reason to 
compel the husband to pay the wife one-half 
of the appraised value if he in fact elects 
to sell the property to a third party rather 
than buy her share at the appraised price. 
If the property is sold to a third party, she 
should receive one-half of the actual sale 
price, without interest, 
652 P.2d at 934 (emphasis supplied). Application of this rule in 
this matter would result in appellant receiving one-half of the 
actual sale price of the home. 
In Davis v. Davis, 655 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982), husband 
challenged the property division made by the trial court. The 
parties had lived together six years and the court concluded that 
the equity in the home at the time of the divorce was $23,000.00. 
The trial court awarded the husband one-half of the equity plus 
one half of any increase which might accrue in the future due to 
inflation. The trial court further ordered the husband to pay to 
the wife $420.00 per month alimony until such time that the sec-
ond mortgage had been paid in full and ordered him to maintain 
life insurance to insure that the mortgage balance would be paid. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the court's order requiring the 
husband to make a further and substantial investment in the prop-
erty upset the equality of the marital property division without 
corresponding benefit to the husband. Therefore, the case was 
remanded to amend the decree. The court stated: 
The unfairness is evident when it is consid-
ered that all proceeds of the second mortgage 
loan went into the improvement of the house. 
Also, he has no right to possession. It 
should also be noted that he was ordered to 
pay approximately $9,000 of debts and $1,000 
attorney's fees for his wife. 
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655 P.2d at 673. 
In examining the award made by the trial court in this 
matter, the evidence proffered was that the husband's net income 
is approximately $2,000.00 per month (Transcript at 19, 20), and 
the wife earns approximately $1,000.00 per month working 
part-time (Transcript at 21, 25). The parties divided the per-
sonal property and it was awarded as stipulated. (R. 80-82). 
The court then awarded each one-half of the husband's retirement. 
(R. 82). The husband was further ordered to pay a $700.00 
orthodontist's bill, his own attorney's fees plus $6,000.00 of 
the wife's attorney's fee, $650.00 per month child support and 
health insurance for the benefit of the child costing between 
$60.00 and $160.00 per month. (R. 79-80). At the time of the 
home's sale, any reduction in the estimated closing costs and 
commission fees will also go to the wife, as well as any increase 
in the equity. The husband was not awarded interest upon his 
share of the equity while the wife remains in the home. Applica-
tion of the guideline decisions demonstrates the trial court 
erred in calculating plaintiff's equity at $32,214.50 because 
this award is speculative and inequitable. The Decree should be 
amended to award husband one-half of the actual sale price of the 
home after taking into account mortgage payments made by the wife 
since dissolution of the marriage. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
AWARDING $6,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
FAVOR OF THE WIFE. 
The trial court may award a reasonable sum in 
attorney's fees where one party shows a need for assistance. The 
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award made by the trial court in this matter is excessive in 
light of the facts of this case and other Utah decisions which 
have awarded wife one-third the amount of fees requested, based 
upon a showing that wife's living expenses exceed her monthly 
earnings. 
The trial court may order either party to pay sums to 
enable the other party "to prosecute or defend the action." Utah 
Code Ann. S 30-3-3 (1984). However, an award of attorney's fees 
will be overturned where the trial court abused its discretion. 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985). Before an 
award may be made, the party requesting assistance must show 
financial need. Christensen v. Christensen, 667 P.2d 592, 596 
(Utah 1983); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 646 (Utah 1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected a request for 
attorney's fees where the party failed to show any necessity for 
assistance in making the payments or an inability to pay. Adams 
v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979) (working wife suing for 
alimony arrearage); Georqedes v. Georqedes, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 
1981)(appeal from decree where wife is employed). The court has 
also refused an award where the record reflects that the husband 
is burdened with his own substantial medical bills and is without 
resources to assist the wife in payment of her legal fees. Ghost 
v. Ghost, 26 Utah 2d 398, 400, 490 P.2d 339, 340 (1971). 
The court has upheld an award of one-third of all 
attorney's fees requested by wife where her monthly expenses 
exceeded her monthly income, Huck v. Hucky 734 P.2d 417, 420 
(Utah 1986) (husband's appeal from property division); Pusey v. 
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Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986), and has awarded portions of 
amounts requested where a significant portion of wife's obliga-
tion arose because of husband's conduct and wife was without 
income other than alimony with which to pay her attorney. 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 410 (Utah 1983). The Utah 
Supreme Court has affirmed an award where the wife was employed 
only four months prior to separation. Walther, 709 P.2d at 388 
(husband appealing award of $2,000.00 of $3,000.00 requested). 
Appellant earns a net income of between $2,100.00 and 
$2,400.00 per month (Transcript at 19, L. 10; Transcript at 25, 
L. 4). Respondent is employed, as she was throughout the mar-
riage, and presently earns $1,100.00 a month on a part-time 
basis. (Transcript at 25, LL. 12-25). Wife estimates her living 
expenses at between $1,765.00 and $2,095.00 per month (Transcript 
at 22, L. 12; Transcript at 28, LL. 17-18). Based upon this and 
other evidence, the court concluded that the husband earns 
$3,326.27 gross income per month and that the wife earns 
$1,100.00 net income per month. (R. at 66 11 4). 
Like the wives in Adams and Georqedes , Respondent 
failed to present evidence directed at showing her financial need 
for assistance in paying her attorney. She is presently 
employed, earning substantial sums on a part-time basis, with 
only one 17-year-old child remaining in the home. (R. 66). Wife 
evidences no extraordinary expenses as a result of child's 
health. (R. 23). Husband was ordered to pay the orthodontic 
bill of the parties, leaving the wife free of marital obliga-
tions, (R. 80) and he was further ordered to pay one-half of the 
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child's future medical expenses not covered by the insurance. 
(R. 79). 
Wife presented evidence that her monthly expenses 
exceed her monthly income. She asserted that her legal expenses 
resulted from the fact that husband had retained other attorneys. 
(Transcript at 26, L. 9). However, in those cases where the 
supreme court has upheld the award of attorney's fees in favor of 
the wife based upon the fact that her monthly income did not 
cover monthly expenses, the court has consistently awarded only 
one-third of the amount requested. Nor have prior awards based 
upon actions by the husband resulted in an order requiring hus-
band to pay the full amount of legal fees as was done in this 
case. 
Here, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
the entire sum of attorney's fees incurred by wife. Wife failed 
to show a need for assistance in paying her legal fees and hus-
band is without resources to assist her in payment of these 
expenses. Furthermore, the amount awarded is triple the amount 
permitted in analogous cases. Accordingly, the trial court's 
award of $6,000.00 in attorney's fees reflects an abuse of dis-
cretion and it should be amended by this court to award no more 
than $2,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in extending child support and 
insurance programs to age 25 in the absence of evidence relating 
to the minor child's anticipated financial needs and impairment. 
The amount of child support ordered was excessive, unfair and 
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inequitable. Appellant had no notice that the court was so 
inclined to award double the amount wife claimed was due and is 
without sufficient means to make the payment she was ordered to 
make. 
The parties stipulated to several matters during trial 
and from the evidence presented clearly agreed that the marital 
home should be equally divided. They disagreed as to how closing 
costs should be paid. The court awarded to husband one-half of a 
speculated amount. This was error and husband should be awarded 
one-half of the actual sale price of the home. 
The court awarded wife attorney's fees totalling three 
times the amount generally awarded to a spouse who evidences 
greater expenses than income and without a showing by wife that 
she had need of such an award. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court should be either amended as requested or vacated and 
remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider the 
amount and duration of child support, division of the marital 
home equity and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 1 day of July, 1987. 
t)AVID S. DOLOWITZ ~PT 
(Utah Bar No. 0899) ^ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPEL-
LANT to the following on this 3/~~ day of July, 1987: 
Mr. Frank J. Gustin 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL t LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
New York Building, 3rd Floor 
48 Post Office Place 
Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
JD071387B 
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V. 
CON KOSTOPULOS #1854 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
712 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt L-ke City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-9500 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED NORMAN ASPER, 
Plaint i f f , 
vs . 
ANE BALLE ASPER, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
FOR DIVORCE *^ DBS 
Civil No. 
Judge 
?"70 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for his cause of action against 
Defendant, complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and have been such residents for more than 
three (3) months prior to the commencement of this action, 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on the 9th day of June, 1959, in Salt L^ke City, Utah. 
3. Defendant has treated Plaintiff in a cruel manner 
causing Plaintiff severe emotional and mental distress. 
4. There have been three children born as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: RICKY ASPER, born August 27, 1961; MARK ASPER, 
born October 26, 1965; and CONNIE ASPER, born September 19, 1969. 
Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of said children subject to Plaintiff's 
reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. 
C < 3 t f ^ ' 
5. Two of the parties1 children have reached their respec-
tive ages of majority and Defendant should be awarded child sup-
port for the youngest childf Connie, in the amount of $150.00 per 
month. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded the tax dependency exemption 
for the minor child on his state and federal income tax returns. 
7. Plaintiff should provide and maintain health insurance 
for the benefit of the parties1 children with all deductables and 
amounts not otherwise covered divided equally between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. Further, Defendant should provide and maintain 
dental insurance for the benefit of said children including 
deductables and amounts not otherwise covered. 
8. Plaintiff should maintain life insurance at current 
levels insuring his life and naming the parties' daughter, 
Connie, the sole beneficiary thereof until such time as said 
child reaches the age of 18. 
9. Defendant is fully employed and grosses $16,000.00 per 
year and is, therefore, neither in need of nor entitled to an 
award of alimony. 
10. The parties acquired a home and lot located 1332 
Colonial Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant should be 
awarded the use and possession of said home subject to an 
equiable lien in Plaintiff to be paid upon the happening of the 
following triggering events: Defendant's remarriage or cohabita-
tion with a man not her spouse; upon the youngest child reaching 
the age of 18; Defendant's ceasing to use the property as her 
primary residence; sale of the property. In the event of 
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Defendants death, said home should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should also hold Plaintiff harmless from any and all 
indebtedness owing on said property. 
11. The parties have incurred certain joint debts which 
debts should be divided as follows: Plaintiff should assume, pay 
and hold Defendant harmless from the obligation owing on the 
VISA bill and completely pay-off the loan to American First 
Credit Union which loan used to purchase the 1977 Honda Accord 
automobile. Defendant should assume, pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless from any remaining balance owing on the Master Charge 
account, together with the obligations owing to Weinstocks, 
Penney1s, Mervyns and ZCMI. The parties should hold each other 
harmless from their respective, individual debts and obligations 
incurred after the date of separation. 
12. Plaintiff should be awarded all monies in his personal 
savings account as his sole and separate property. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendant should be awarded their respec-
tive retirement acccounts and/or pension plans free and clear of 
any interest in each other. 
14. The stocks and bonds from the Limited Partnership 
interest should be divided equally between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
15. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1976 Jeep Wagoneer 
together with and the 1977 Honda Accord, subejct to the indebted-
ness owing thereon as specified above, and Defendant awarded the 
1978 VW Sirroco automobile. 
16. Out of the parties' furniture, furnishings and fixtures, 
Plaintiff should specifically be awarded the 2 rolltop desks and 
the walnut chair with red upholstry which was a gift from 
Plaintiff's grandfather as his sole and separate property 
together with the dining room set (which set includes the table, 
chairs, buffet and dining cabinet), the Quazar TV, 2 work 
benches, tools and equipment, the stereo system and cabinet, and 
Plaintiff's personal effects and clothing. Defendant should be 
awarded her personalty. All other miscellaneous items of fur-
niture, furnishings and fixtures should be divided equally bet-
ween the parties according to the value of said items. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows: 
1# For a Decree of Divorce from Defendant. 
2. For the allocation of the personalty, real property and 
indebtedness as specified above. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
DATED this ^ /. daY o f June, 1985. 
CONKOSTOPULOS' 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ALFRED NORMAN ASPER, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
That he has read and is familiar with the contents of the 
foregoing Verified Complaint, and knows and believes the allega-
tions contained therein to be true according the best of his 
OOGCO 
knowledge, in format ion and b e l i e f . 
•-ALFRED NORMAN A S P E R / 
P l a i n t i f f 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME t h i s *f day of June , 1985, 
Mv Commission E x p i r e s : (^/ 1^,/L /{ ^ J&jJ 
AR#"PUBL/C / I ~ ^ NOT I 
Ce//1/ / jf£~> Res id ing I n : S a l t L»ke County, UT 
t / * 
q S a l t 
rtuio IN cr.fi'/. • > 
FRANK J. GUSTIN (A1279) 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
ALFRED N. ASPER, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Civil No. D-85-2070 
ANE A. ASPER, : Judge David B. Dee 
Defendant. : 
oOo 
On the 16th day of September and November 20, 1986, the 
above-styled cause came on for hearing on the merits before the 
above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Peter W. Guyon, and Defendant appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Frank J. Gustin, and evidence 
having been proferred pursuant to stipulation of counsel, and the 
Court having listened to arguments and representations of counsel 
and having reviewed the letter of Dr. Ward and the exhibits and 
documentation on file herein, and Plaintiff and Defendant having 
been sworn and examined and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and upon Motion of Frank J. Gustin, attorney for 
Defendant, does now make and enter the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties hereto are husband and wife, having been 
married on the 9th day of June, 1959, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Both parties are now and for the three (3) months next 
prior to the commencement of this action were actual and bona 
fide residents of the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
3. The parties to this action are the parents of three (3) 
children, one of whom is under the age of majority, Connie Lynne 
Asper, a female, age 17, born September 19, 1969, and who cur-
rently resides with Defendant. Since 1974, Connie has been and 
is now afflicted with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, with signif-
icant deformity of hands, fists, wrists and feet, and with 
limited mobility of shoulder, neck, hips and knees and, as such, 
the Court finds that she is permanently disabled and is not able 
to be competitively employed in the current job market, and 
Connie should be considered permanently disabled pending such 
time that she is able to gain specific job skills. 
4. Plaintiff earns a gross monthly salary of $3,326.27, 
and should pay $650.00 per month child support to Defendant for 
the benefit of Connie, who has special needs, until she reaches 
the age of twenty-five (25) , with the first payment to be made on 
September 16, 1986, and like payments on the 15th day of each 
month thereafter. 
5. Defendant is employed on a part-time basis and earns 
approximately $1,100.00 per month net income. Defendant should 
be awarded $1.00 per year alimony and the award of alimony and 
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child support should be reviewed by the Court when Connie reaches 
the age of twenty-five years. 
6* Defendant is a fit and proper person to have the 
permanent care, custody and control of the minor child of the 
parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation on behalf of 
Plaintiff at reasonable times and places and under reasonable 
circumstances as the parties may agree. 
7. Plaintiff maintains health and accident insurance 
through his employment for himself and Connie which he should 
continue to maintain for Connie's benefit until she reaches the 
age of twenty-five years and/or until further order of the Court. 
Any medical expenses not covered by Plaintiff's insurance and 
deductibles shall be paid one-half by Plaintiff and one-half by 
Defendant, except as otherwise provided herein. 
8. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff shall pay 
the balance of the orthodontal bill for Connie in the amount of 
$750.00 to Richard L. Curtis, D.D.S., and Plaintiff should hold 
Defendant harmless from said obligation. 
9. During the parties' marriage, each party has treated 
the other cruelly, causing that party great mental distress, by 
withdrawing love and affection from that party such that the 
continuation of this marriage is impossible. 
10. The parties hereto have stipulated to a division of 
their personal property as follows: 
A. Plaintiff shall be awarded the following described 
personal property, free of any claim of right, title or 
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interest in Defendant, but subject to any indebtedness 
outstanding thereon: Plaintiff's IRA; the 1977 Honda 
automobile; the 1977 Jeep automobile; one-half of the SNI 
707 account; one-half of the SNI 708 account; one-half of 
the Source Capital stock; one-half of the ZCMI stock; 
one-half ($1,200.00) of the America First Credit Union 
savings account; the business known as Fred's Repair; 
paintings; one-half of the miscellaneous hand garden tools; 
one power lawn mower; two workbenches, radial arm saw; 
turning lathe; miscellaneous hand tools (except miscella-
neous hand tools to be retained by Defendant for general 
house use); two rolltop desks; four-drawer filing cabinet; 
steel desk, television; stereo; chair and footstool; the 
gardening and World War II Time-Life books; Plaintiff's 
textbooks; gun cabinet; tent; camp lantern; one kerosene 
lamp; hall tree with mirror; dining room table, chairs, 
linens and leaves; oak china cupboard; walnut buffet; walnut 
silver cabinet; walnut velvet chair; three metal cabinets; 
one steel tool cabinet; and all other items of personal 
property presently in Plaintiff's possession, except for 
items specifically granted to Defendant. 
The dining room table, chairs, linens, leaves; the oak 
china cupboard; the walnut buffet; the walnut silver cabinet; 
and the walnut velvet chair shall remain in Defendant's 
possession until Defendant remarries, the minor child 
reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years or the house at 
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1332 South Colonial Drive is sold, at which time and upon 
whichever event first occurs, Plaintiff will be entitled to 
receive the same. 
B. Defendant shall be awarded the following items of 
personal property, free of any claim of right, title or 
interest in Plaintiff, but subject to any and all indebted-
ness thereon: Defendant's IRA; one-half of the SNI 707 
account; one-half of the SNI 708 account; one-half of the 
Source Capital stock; one-half of the ZCMI stock; one-half 
($1,200.00) of the America First Credit Union savings 
account; the 1978 Scirocco automobile; the microwave; two 
refrigerators; range; kitchen table and six chairs; three 
occasional chairs; one coffee table; china (service for 12); 
punch bowl and cups; silver ladle; two large bookcases; two 
stereo cabinets; one power lawnmower; Bosch bread maker; 
Cuisinart food processor; recliner; daybed; figurines; 
Danish wall plates; cordless telephone; color television; 
VCR; freezer; washer; dryer; gas barbecue; lawn furniture; 
king size bed and headboard; dressing table; Time-Life books 
not specifically granted to Plaintiff; the two kerosene 
lamps purchased in Denmark; one-half of the miscellaneous 
garden tools, miscellaneous hand tools for general household 
purposes; gray cosmetic case; and all items of personal 
property presently in Defendant's possession except for the 
items specifically granted to Plaintiff above. 
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11. The parties own a residence at 1332 South Colonial 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Lot 18, Block 1, Colonial 
Hills Subdivision, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
which the parties agree has a fair market value of $104,400.00. 
The mortgage on the property is the amount of $25,627.00. 
Defendant should be awarded the home, subject to the mortgage, 
which Defendant should pay as the same becomes due, and Plaintiff 
should have a lien against the property for one-half of the 
equity, after allowance for payment of real estate commissions 
and closing costs calculated at 8% of the present value of the 
home, or a lien in the amount of $35,214.50 for his share of the 
equity. Plaintiff's equity shall be due upon whichever of the 
following events first occurs: sale of the home, Defendant's 
remarriage, or when Connie reaches the age of twenty-five years. 
Plaintiff's lien shall not bear interest. 
12. Plaintiff is 47 years of age and has been employed 
during the course of the marriage at Hill Field Air Force Base, 
Utah, 84056, as a civilian since July 16, 1965, and has accu-
mulated benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System. The 
parties have agreed that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
should issue to award Defendant, Ane A. Asper, fifty percent 
(50%) of all benefits presently accumulated under the plan as of 
the date of the Decree of Divorce, including survivorship annu-
ities, cost of living allowances and such other increases and 
benefits as may accumulate under the plan attributable to said 
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50% interest; and that she should be awarded such health benefits 
as Defendant may be entitled to as provided by law. In the event 
Plaintiff separates from service in advance of retirement and 
withdraws funds accumulated, Defendant should be entitled also to 
receive her proportionate share based upon the above formula. 
The Decree entered herein should be subject to modification 
so as to meet the requirements of the Office of Personnel 
Management, Administrator of the Plan, if necessary, in order 
that its requirements might be met to obtain a Stipulated 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order for Defendant, and Plaintiff 
should be ordered to assist Defendant in accomplishing this 
division. 
13. Defendant has had to employ counsel to defend and 
prosecute this action and should be awarded $6,000.00 by way of 
attorney's fees, which the Court finds reasonable based upon the 
Affidavit of Defendant's counsel. That the award of $6,000.00 
shall not bear interest and shall be payable to Defendant out of 
Plaintiff's equity in the home when the same becomes due as 
provided in paragraph 11 above. 
14. The Court finds that an Order to Withhold and Deliver 
will be issued should the Plaintiff become thirty (30) days 
delinquent in his child support obligation pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45(d)-l et. seq. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does hereby 
make and enter the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant, and Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
Plaintiff the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Defendant should be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child of the parties, subject to reasonable 
visitation rights at all reasonable times and places and under 
reasonable circumstances as the parties may agree. 
3. The minor child, Connie, is disabled with juvenile 
rheumatoid arthritis and is in need of special care and support 
until age twenty-five years, at which time the Court should 
review her condition and needs for continuing support, and 
Defendant should be awarded $650.00 per month child support until 
the minor child reaches twenty-five years of age, with the first 
payment to be made on September 16, 1986, and like payments on 
the 15th day of each month thereafter. 
4. Defendant should be awarded $1.00 per year alimony. 
The award of alimony and child support should be reviewed by the 
Court when the youngest child, Connie, reaches the age of twenty-
five years. 
5. Plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the existing 
health and accident insurance for the benefit of Connie and until 
she reaches the age of twenty-five years and/or until further 
order of the Court. Any medical expenses not covered by 
Plaintiff's insurance and deductibles should be paid one-half by 
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Plaintiff and one-half by Defendant, except as otherwise provided 
herein, 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay the balance of the 
orthodontist bill of $750.00 in favor of Richard L. Curtis, 
D.D.S., and Plaintiff should hold Defendant harmless from said 
obligation. 
7. The stipulation of the parties regarding the permanent 
distribution of the personal property as set forth in the Findings 
of Fact should be included in the Decree of Divorce to be entered. 
8. Defendant is entitled to a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order and should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of all of 
Plaintiff's Civil Service Retirement benefits accumulated under 
the plan as of the date of the Decree of Divorce, including 
survivorship annuities, cost of living allowances and such other 
increases as may accumulate under the plan attributable to said 
50% interest; and that she should be awarded such health benefits 
as Defendant may be entitled to as provided by law. In the event 
Plaintiff separates from service in advance of retirement and 
withdraws funds accumulated# Defendant should be entitled also to 
receive her proportionate share based upon the above formula. 
9. The home of the parties should be awarded to Defendant, 
subject to the mortgage thereon, which she should assume and pay, 
and Plaintiff should have a lien on the home in the amount of 
$35,214.50 payable without interest upon whichever of the 
following events first occurs: sale of the home, Defendant's 
remarriage, or when Connie becomes twenty-five years of age. 
10. Defendant should be awarded $6,000.00 attorney's fees 
to be paid out of Plaintiff's equity in the home when the same 
becomes due. Said award shall not bear interest. 
11. The Decree entered herein should be subject to modi-
fication so as to meet the requirements of the Office of 
Personnel Management, Administrator of the Plan, so as to meet 
its requirements in obtaining a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order for Defendant, and Plaintiff should be ordered to assist 
Defendant in accomplishing this division. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this ^ ( o day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tllfl^lWtfffRABLE »AVID B. DEE 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
ved a s t o form: 
feER'V. GUYON / 
ttorney for Plaintiff J 
\hy 
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FRANK J. 4GUSTIN (A1279) 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
A - , . . -
fa 2/2- M . 5^3/ 
ALFRED N. ASPER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANE A. ASPER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-85-2070 
Judge David B. Dee 
-oOo-
On the 16th day of September, 1986, and November 20, 1986, 
the above-styled and numbered cause came on for hearing on the 
merits before the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Peter W. Guyon, and Defendant 
appearing in person and by and through counsel, Frank J. Gustin, 
and evidence having been preferred pursuant to stipulation of 
counsel, and the Court having listened to arguments and 
represenations of counsel and having reviewed the letter of Dr. 
Ward and the exhibits and documentation on file herein, and 
Plaintiff and Defendant having been sworn and examined and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having 
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion 
of Frank J. Gustin of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, attorneys 
for Defendant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff be, and hereby is, granted a Decree of 
Divorce from Defendant and Defendant be, and hereby is, granted a 
Decree of Divorce from Plaintiff, said Decree to become final 
upon entry. 
2. Defendant be, and hereby is, granted custody of the 
parties1 minor child, to-wit: Connie Lynne Asper, age 17, born 
September 19, 1969, subject to reasonable rights of visitation on 
behalf of Plaintiff at reasonable times and places and under 
reasonable circumstances as the parties may agree. 
3. Plaintiff be, and hereby is, ordered to pay to Defendant 
the sum of $650.00 per month child support for the benefit of 
Connie, who has special needs due to her affliction with juvenile 
rheumatoid arthritis, until she reaches the age of twenty-five 
(25), with the first payment to be made on September 16, 1986, 
and like payments on the 15th day of each month thereafter. 
4. Defendant be and she is hereby awarded $1.00 per year 
alimony and the award of alimony and child support shall be 
reviewed by the Court when Connie reaches the age of twenty-five 
years. 
5. Plaintiff be, and hereby is, ordered to maintain the 
existing health and accident insurance for the benefit of Connie 
and until she reaches the age of twenty-five years and/or until 
further order of the Court. Any medical expenses not covered by 
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Plaintiff's insurance and deductibles shall be paid one-half by 
Plaintiff and one-half by Defendant, except as otherwise provided 
herein. 
6. Plaintiff be, and hereby is, ordered to assume and pay 
the orthodontist bill in the amount of $750.00 owed to Richard L. 
Curtis, D.D.S., and Plaintiff shall hold Defendant harmless from 
said obligation. 
7. Plaintiff be, and hereby is, awarded the following 
described personal property, free of any claim of right, title or 
interest in Defendant, but subject to any indebtedness outstanding 
thereon: Plaintiff's IRA; the 1977 Honda automobile; the 1977 
Jeep automobile; one-half of the SNI 707 account; one-half of the 
SNI 708 account; one-half of the Source Capital stock; one-half 
of the ZCMI stock; one-half ($1,200.00) of the America First 
Credit Union savings account; the business known as Fred's 
Repair; paintings; one-half of the miscellaneous hand garden 
tools; one power lawn mower; two workbenches, radial arm saw; 
turning lathe; miscellaneous hand tools (except miscellaneous 
hand tools to be retained by Defendant for general house use); 
two rolltop desks; four-drawer filing cabinet; steel desk, 
television; stereo; chair and footstool; the gardening and World 
War II Time-Life books; Plaintiff's textbooks; gun cabinet; tent; 
camp lantern; one kerosene lamp; hall tree with mirror; dining 
room table, chairs, linens and leaves; oak china cupboard; walnut 
buffet; walnut silver cabinet; walnut velvet chair; three metal 
cabinets; one steel tool cabinet; and all other items of personal 
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property presently in Plaintiff's possession, except for items 
specifically granted to Defendant. 
The dining room table, chairs, linens, leaves; the oak china 
cupboard; the walnut buffet; the walnut silver cabinet; and the 
walnut velvet chair shall remain in Defendant's possession until 
Defendant remarries, the minor child reaches the age of twenty-
one (21) years or the house at 1332 South Colonial Drive is sold, 
at which time and upon whichever event first occurs, Plaintiff 
will be entitled to receive the same. 
8. Defendant be, and hereby is, awarded the following 
items of personal property, free of any claim of right, title or 
interest in Plaintiff, but subject to any and all indebtedness 
thereon: Defendant's IRA; one-half of the SNI 707 account; 
one-half of the SNI 708 account; one-half of the Source Capital 
stock; one-half of the ZCMI stock; one-half ($1,200.00) of the 
America First Credit Union savings account; the 1978 Scirocco 
automobile; the microwave; two refrigerators; range; kitchen 
table and six chairs; three occasional chairs; one coffee table; 
china (service for 12); punch bowl and cups; silver ladle; two 
large bookcases; two stereo cabinets; one power lawnmower; Bosch 
bread maker; Cuisinart food processor; recliner; daybed; 
figurines; Danish wall plates; cordless telephone; color tele-
vision; VCR; freezer; washer; dryer; gas barbecue; lawn furniture; 
king size bed and headboard; dressing table; Time-Life books not 
specifically granted to Plaintiff; the two kerosene lamps pur-
chased in Denmark; one-half of the miscellaneous garden tools, 
4 
miscellaneous hand tools for general household purposes; gray 
cosmetic case; and all items of personal property presently in 
Defendant's possession except for the items specifically granted 
to Plaintiff above. 
9. The home of the parties located at 1332 South Colonial 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Lot 18, Block 1, Colonial 
Hills Subdivision, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
be and the same is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the 
mortgage, which Defendant is ordered to pay as the same becomes 
due, and Plaintiff shall have a lien against the property for 
one-half of the equity, after allowance for payment of real 
estate commissions and closing costs calculated at 8% of the 
present value of the home, or a lien in the amount of $35,214.50 
for his share of the equity* Plaintiff's equity shall be due 
upon whichever of the following events first occurs: sale of the 
home, Defendant's remarriage, or when Connie reaches the age of 
twenty-five years. Plaintiff's lien shall not bear interest. 
10. It is hereby ordered that a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order shall issue to award Defendant, Ane A. Asper, fifty percent 
(50%) of all benefits presently accumulated under Plaintiff's 
Civil Service Retirement System Plan as of the date of this 
Decree of Divorce, including survivorship annuities, cost of 
living allowances and such other increases and benefits as may 
accumulate under the plan attributable to said 50% interest; and 
that she shall be awarded such health benefits as Defendant may 
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be entitled to as provided by law. In the event Plaintiff 
separates from service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
funds accumulated, Defendant shall be entitled also to receive 
her proportionate share based upon the above formula. 
This provision and the Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
shall be subject to modification so as to meet the requirements 
of the Office of Personnel Management, Administrator of the Plan, 
if necessary, in order that its requirements might be met to 
obtain a Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order for 
Defendant, and Plaintiff is hereby ordered to assist Defendant in 
accomplishing this division. 
11. Defendant be and she is hereby awarded $6,000.00 by way 
of attorney's fees. This award to Defendant of $6,000.00 shall 
not bear interest and shall be payable to Defendant out of 
Plaintiff's equity in the home when the same becomes due as 
provided in paragraph 9 above. 
12. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to cooperate 
with one another in dividing the property and transferring to one 
another the property awarded to each and are ordered to do all 
other things necessary or appropriate to effectuate the 
provisions of this Decree. 
13. An Order to Withhold and Deliver, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45(d)-l et. seq. be and is hereby ordered to be issued 
should the Plaintiff become thirty (30) days delinquent in his 
child support obligation. 
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JKDKAeLE^AVID^B. DEE 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
PETERS VU- JGUYON / 
1
 Attorney for Plafntliff K
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